What Happened to Liquidity When World War I Shut the NYSE?
I. Introduction
It is not so surprising that the outbreak of World War I forced the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) to close. The threat of European liquidation of US securities probably justified a suspension in trading --as a preventive measure or circuit breaker. It is surprising, however, that the Exchange remained shuttered for more than four months, from August 1, 1914 to December 12, 1914 Closing the Exchange for more than four months would be unthinkable today. It was also unthinkable in 1914. (November 16, 1914) , in part, because a liquid marketplace had emerged to accommodate trading. This liquid alternative, the New Street market, relieved the pressure to reopen the Exchange.
The contemporaneous commentary frequently disparaged the New Street market. The Wall Street Journal [January 7, 1915] said: "The quotations that were made in New Street were no more legitimate than the quotations that were made in Belgium, where people with securities in their pockets, and fleeing from war and starvation, sold them for cash at thirty and forty percent discount to some itinerant peddler." More recently, Friedman and Schwartz [1963, p.172fn] referred to New Street as an 'outlaw' market and Sobel [1968 p.344] called it a 'gutter' market.
New Street has been discredited largely out of ignorance. That ignorance stems from an effective campaign by the New York Stock Exchange during the trading suspension to suppress New Street prices. The NYSE Ticker did not disseminate New Street transactions. Henry Noble, President of the NYSE, successfully lobbied the leading newspapers of the day to embargo New Street quotations (see Noble [1915, pp.24-6] ). The press satirized the legitimacy of New Street, and academics perpetuated the misrepresentation, because price data were unavailable publicly to refute the allegations. Amihud and Mendelson [1986] and Silber [1991] show that illiquidity has a potential negative impact on stock prices. 6 The major European exchanges had already closed so that sales could not take place abroad. See footnote 11 for some contradictory evidence on whether prices would have declined had the NYSE opened. was not advertised in the press, furnished a safety valve;" but he then concludes: 
III. A Profile of New Street
The New York Times [January 3, 1915] reviewed the activities of the New Street market as follows: "It furnished a market where stocks could be bought and sold by those who had especial need of liquidating their holdings or had money to invest…At the height of its activity, the New Street market consisted of rehearse them. Time, however, is quick to dim even acute memories and Wall Street, of all places, is the land of forgetfulness. This being the case, it seemed to the writer of these pages that some record be kept…by one who happened to be very favorably placed to know the story in its entirety." Noble is right that first-hand histories benefit from 'inside information' but they often suffer from the protagonist's perspective. In this case, Noble's 'land of forgetfulness' clouded his story. 15 I would like to thank Steven Wheeler, Archivist at the New York Stock Exchange, for help in locating the Records and for providing copies of some of the entries. The Records total four binders, each of which is about one inch thick. They contain all of the public releases issued by the Committee but do not describe any of its deliberations. In addition to the published price quotations, the Records also contain news clippings reporting on the Committee's activities. 16 [Sobel 1971, pp.3-4] Table 1 displays data for a total of twenty stocks in our sample: The first ten stocks have the lowest average bid-ask spread in New Street over the sample period and the last ten stocks have the highest average spread. The spread is measured in percent:
where P a is the ask price and P b is the bid price.
Column 1 of Table 1 shows the stock's daily average spread on New Street during the sample. For example, the first entry in column 1 shows that the average spread for Reading Railroad was .437 percent on New Street. The last entry shows that Rumely had an average spread of 15.54 percent. Column 2 provides the daily average spread for the same companies when they traded on the NYSE during a 28-day period ending with July 29, 1914. 23 For the entire sample of 71 securities, the average spread on New Street is 2.47 percent compared with a spread of 1.34 percent on the NYSE. 24 The increase in spreads is not surprising, given the impaired flow of New Street's price information. A key question is whether the increased spreads were large 22 The 46 securities that were disqualified include, 37 that had fewer than 10 observations, six that lacked a complete set of data from the NYSE, two that showed no change in either bid or offer price over the sample period, and one that was a bond. Almost all of the 37 stocks with fewer than 10 observations were not quoted when Edward F. Breen was the data source in the Morning Telegraph. 23 The NYSE sample ends on July 29, excluding the day before trading was suspended. July 30 was abnormally active and might have distorted the pre-suspension sample. 24 The averages in Table 1 are mean spreads. Median spreads are usually smaller for stocks on both New Street and the NYSE. For example, the median spread on New Street is 2.31 percent and the median spread on the NYSE is 1.18 percent. The qualitative comparisons between New Street and the NYSE are the same for mean and median spreads.
enough to cause a measurable 'liquidity discount' in stock prices (see Amihud and Mendelson [1986] and Silber [1991] House, on the other hand, was that it did not provide a two-sided market when there were more potential sellers than buyers at July 30 closing prices.
A two-sided market means that both a bid price and ask (offer) price are quoted so that potential sellers can hit bids and buyers can lift offers if they wish to transact immediately. It was always possible to buy immediately in the NYSE Clearing House from the available offers (either at or above July 30 closing prices), but it was not always possible to sell there because bids below July 30
were not permitted. Moreover, although a trader could always buy at the Clearing House from a seller at the July 30 close, the price would be 'too high' if the market-clearing equilibrium were below that level.
New Street quotes were always two-sided, even for the least liquid stocks.
Thus if there were sellers only at the Clearing House and no buyers, some of those potential sellers could dispose of their securities at the quoted bid prices on New Street. This disposal facility was an important liquidity service. However, potential sellers would be uncertain if the low bid price stemmed from a decline in the equilibrium price or was simply a reflection of the relatively wide bid-ask spreads on New Street.
When both the bid and offer on New Street were below the July 30 closing price, the New Street market dominated the NYSE Clearing House for both potential buyers and potential sellers. Moreover, under those circumstances the low bid prices gained credibility from the accompanying low offer prices. These results show that New Street offered liquidity services that were meaningful despite wider bid-ask spreads compared with the New York Stock
Exchange. 27 New Street still had to overcome the NYSE trademark enjoyed by the Clearing House as well as the impaired dissemination of price information.
The economic incentive to shift order flow to New Street should be greatest for 27 The New York Times [August 2, 1914] , reports that short sellers complained that the trading suspension would rob them of their profits if the NYSE were not reopened until after prices recovered. Shorts had the opportunity to close out their positions profitably when offer prices on New Street were below the July 30 close. Short sellers were, therefore, among the important beneficiaries of two-sided New Street liquidity. (1) S it = a o + a 1 Log V it + a 2 Log P it + a 3 SD i + e it , where S it is the percentage spread on stock i at time period t; V it is the dollar volume of trading in stock i at time period t; P it is the price level of stock i at time period t; SD i is the historical standard deviation of stock i; and e it is the error term.
Least squares estimation of equation (1) with contemporaneous crosssectional data on V it and S it is inappropriate because volume of trading and spreads are simultaneously determined. Higher volume leads to lower spreads because of dealer inventory behavior but lower spreads attract higher volume because of public investor behavior. It is also impossible to estimate equation (1) for New Street because the Morning telegraph did not publish trading volume.
One solution to the estimation problem is to replace volume on New Street with a set of exogenous instruments. Replacing log V it in equation (1) above with PminAsk it produces the following equation:
(2) S it = a o + a 1 PminAsk it + a 2 Log P it + a 3 SD i + e it ,
Column 1 of Table 2 shows the ordinary least squares estimates of the coefficients in equation (2) The impaired dissemination of price information on New Street suggests that other factors might also influence order flow to New Street. In particular, stocks that have a reputation for liquidity might also experience higher order flow.
We know that reputation matters in the liquidity services business. Silber [1984, p. 941 ] describes how marketmakers continuously quote a two-sided market to foster a reputation for liquidity so they can attract order flow. Exchanges with an established reputation for liquidity succeed against competitors, in part, because brokers have a fiduciary responsibility to send order flow to the most liquid market. In our case, the impaired price transparency on New Street should make liquidity a function of an individual stock's reputation for liquidity.
An indicator of a stock's reputation for liquidity is persistently high historical trading volume. Average dollar volume of trading on the NYSE prior to the trading halt should reflect a stocks long-term reputation for liquidity and is an appropriate added instrument for New Street volume.
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Column 2 of Table 2 shows the results of a least squares estimation of equation (2) with Log V i , the stock's average daily dollar volume on the NYSE during the 28-day period ending on July 29, 1914, added to equation
(1). All of the variables in column 2 are significant, including Log V i which has the expected negative sign. This result confirms that the impaired dissemination of 29 Note that average volume on the NYSE prior to the trading suspension has no necessary linkage to the purely economic incentive to shift order flow to New Street. Thus if historical NYSE volume explains the structure of spreads it is purely a reputation effect.
New Street price information provides a special role for an individual stock's reputation for liquidity in explaining spreads.
VI. Conclusion
It is easy to understand why New Street emerged almost immediately after the suspension of trading on the New York Stock Exchange following the outbreak of World War I. Few economic activities are as reliable as attempts to circumvent regulation. It is impressive, however, that the New Street market provided economically meaningful liquidity services despite extensive efforts to stifle its operations.
New Street survived competition from the NYSE Clearing House facility, it overcame disparaging newspaper publicity that denigrated the quality of its product and it survived efforts to muzzle the dissemination of crucial price information. It is disappointing that academics have perpetuated the myth of New Street's ineffectiveness by using pejoratives like 'gutter' and 'outlaw' to describe the market. New Street's reputation should, at least, reflect the fact that its liquidity dominated the NYSE Clearing House more than sixty percent of the time.
The cost of transacting on New Street suffered somewhat from the impaired flow of price information but responded to economic incentives and to a stock's reputation for liquidity. Reputation always matters in the liquidity services industry but it becomes especially important when markets lack transparency. S it = the ask price minus bid price divided by the average of the bid and ask prices, multiplied by 100, for each stock i on day t during the New Street sample.
PminAsk it = the July 30 closing price minus the ask price, divided by the ask price, multiplied by 100, for each stock i on day t during the New Street sample.
P it = the average of the bid price and ask price for each stock i on day t during the New Street sample.
V i = the average daily dollar volume on the NYSE during the 28-day period ending on July 29, 1914 for each stock i.
SD i = the standard deviation of returns on the NYSE during the 28-day period ending July 29, 1914 for each stock i. 
